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ABSTRACT
As large eye-tracking datasets are created, data privacy is a pressing
concern for the eye-tracking community. De-identifying data does
not guarantee privacy because multiple datasets can be linked for
inferences. A common belief is that aggregating individuals’ data
into composite representations such as heatmaps protects the indi-
vidual. However, we analytically examine the privacy of (noise-free)
heatmaps and show that they do not guarantee privacy. We further
propose two noise mechanisms that guarantee privacy and analyze
their privacy-utility tradeoff. Analysis reveals that our Gaussian
noise mechanism is an elegant solution to preserve privacy for
heatmaps. Our results have implications for interdisciplinary re-
search to create differentially private mechanisms for eye tracking.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Human and societal aspects of se-
curity and privacy; Privacy protections.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With advances in mobile and ubiquitous eye tracking, there is am-
ple opportunity to collect eye tracking data at scale. A user’s gaze
encodes valuable information including attention, intent, emotional
state, cognitive ability, and health. This information can be used
to gain insight into human behavior (e.g. in marketing and user
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experience design), create computational models (e.g. for smart
environments and vehicles), and enable interventions (e.g. health
and education). When combined with physiological sensing and
contextual data, this information facilitates the modeling and pre-
diction of human behavior and decision making. As users become
increasingly conscious about what their data reveals about them,
there is mounting pressure on policymakers and corporations to
introduce robust privacy regulations and processes [1; 12]. The eye
tracking community must actively pursue research about privacy
for broad public acceptance of this technology.
Data privacy for eye tracking has been raised as a concern in the
community [16; 21]. At a recent Dagstuhl seminar on ubiquitous
gaze sensing and interaction1, privacy considerations were high-
lighted in a number of papers in the proceedings [3]. Privacy as a
general term has a wide range of meanings and different levels of
importance for different users. Privacy can obviously be preserved
by distorting or randomizing the answers to queries, however doing
so renders the information in the dataset useless.
To maintain privacy while preserving the utility of the informa-
tion, we propose to apply the concept of differential privacy (DP)
which has been developed by theoretical computer scientists and ap-
plied to database applications over the past decade [7]. Differential
privacy can be summarized as follows:
Privacy is maintained if an individual’s records cannot
be accurately identified, even in the worst case when
all other data has been exposed by adversaries.
Our technical contributions are: (1) We introduce the notion of
differential privacy for eye tracking data. (2) We formally examine
the privacy of aggregating eye tracking data as heatmaps and show
that aggregating into heatmaps does not guarantee privacy from
a DP perspective. (3) We propose two mechanisms to improve the
privacy of aggregated gaze data. (4) We analyze the privacy-utility
trade-off of these mechanisms from a DP-point of view.
From a practical perspective, the notion of differential privacy is
both achievable and theoretically verifiable. Though the proofs may
be mathematically sophisticated, the implementation is straight-
forward, and can be integrated into the eye tracking data collection
pipeline. Figure 1 illustrates how this may be achieved. Privacy
is guaranteed for the worst case when an adversary has already
gained access to the data of all other individuals in a dataset (by
hacking them for example). Even in this case, the adversary will
1https://www.dagstuhl.de/18252
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Figure 1: Workflow for researchers and practioners to create the desired strength of privacy level. The solid lines illustrate
the standard workflow for generating an aggregate static heatmap from eye tracking data. The dotted lines show how to
implement a privacy protocol with small modifications to this workflow. The hotspots on the privacy enhanced heatmap
are visually in the same locations as the original heatmap. The supplementary materials show several examples of privacy
enhanced heatmaps for the same noise level.
still not be able to accurately infer data records of the individual.
In applying the general definition of differential privacy to eye
tracking, we acknowledge that individual users, service providers,
and policy makers may have different positions on what level of
privacy versus utility is desirable. Our work provides a theoretically
grounded analysis of privacy preserving mechanisms to empower
these stakeholders to make such decisions.
Implications. Table 1 presents some of the threats that may
be posed if an adversary was to access eye tracking data with no
privacy protocol in place. Specifically, we elaborate three scenarios
where eye tracking data is collected with good intentions, but if
hacked, could have consequences for the individuals concerned.
Scenario 1: A hospital or doctor’s office collects eye tracking data
as part of patients’ general examination. A research grant enables
a team to use this data to build a machine learning model that can
predict whether someone has a certain neurological disorder. A hacker
gains unauthorized access to this database and is able to identify
specific individuals with the disorder. The hacker then sells or publicly
releases the identity of these individuals, negatively impacting their
employment opportunities, inflating their health insurance costs, and
elevating their social and emotional anxiety.
Scenario 2: A parent signs a consent form allowing her child to be
eye tracked in a classroom. The consent form says that this data is for
a research project to understand and characterize learning disabilities
Table 1: In most cases, eye tracking data is released with the stimuli. This table illustrates the threats posed by releasing this
data if no privacy protocol is in place.
Type of data Example of intended use What adversary can
access in worst case
What adversary can
do now
Does DP apply?
Raw eye movements Foveated rendering Raw eye movements Neurological diagnoses
(see Scenario 1)
yes, future work
Aggregated data with-
out temporal informa-
tion (static heatmaps)
Marketing, UX design, edu-
cation
Individual’s heatmap Behavioral diagnoses
(see Scenario 2)
yes, this paper
Aggregated data with
temporal information
(dynamic heatmaps)
Training models for au-
tonomous vehicles
Individual’s heatmap Establish driver’s liabil-
ity (see Scenario 3)
yes, future work
Areas of Interest (AOI)
analysis
Expert vs novice analysis Individual’s AOI visit
order
Autism spectrum diag-
noses
yes, future work
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and build interventions. The anonymized dataset will be released as
part of an NIH big data initiative. If an adversary manages to access
an individual child’s data and analyze it for markers of dyslexia (for
example), they may sell the information to a marketing company that
will contact the parent with unsolicited advertising for therapies.
Scenario 3: A publicly funded research team is using eye tracking
to study awareness and fatigue of commercial truck drivers. The eye
movement data along with the scene being viewed is streamed to a
remote server for later analysis. A driver in the study was involved
in an accident that resulted in a fatality. Although drivers were told
their data would be de-identified, a private investigator, hired by the
family of the deceased, was able to extract his/her data record from
the database, revealing evidence that (s)he was at fault in the accident.
In scenarios such as these, research teams may reassure partic-
ipants that raw data will not be released, or that individual data
will be de-identified or aggregated (often in the form of heatmaps),
providing the impression that privacy is preserved.
2 BACKGROUND
2.0.1 The problem with de-identification. The first “solution” that
occurs to many of us is to simply anonymize, or de-identify the
dataset. This operation refers to removing personal identifiers such
as the name of the participant from the dataset. The problem with
this approach is that it is not future-proof; as newer datasets are
released, multiple datasets can be linked, and the identity of a
participant can then be inferred [13; 18; 25; 26].
2.0.2 The problemwith running queries. A second “solution”would
be to not release the dataset as is, rather allow the analyst to query
the dataset. The dataset would not allow queries on individual items,
but only on large numbers of items. In other words, a query such as
“Where did the student with the lowest grade look?” would be disal-
lowed. But then, the analyst can run queries such as “Where did the
students who did not have the lowest grade look?”, and “Where did
all the students look?”, and use these queries to infer the disallowed
query. This “solution” is not able to guarantee privacy in the worst
case, for example, if the adversary hacks the data of n − 1 out of n
persons in the dataset. Then (s)he can easily infer the nth person’s
data by querying the average or sum of the dataset.
These issues are well known in database research. One widely
accepted formal definition of privacy that has emerged from this
extensive research is as follows: an individual’s privacy is preserved
if the inferences that are made from the dataset do not indicate in
any significant way whether this individual is part of the dataset
or not. This notion is called differential privacy.
2.0.3 Differential privacy. Differential privacy as a concept was
conceived through insights by theoretical computer scientists aim-
ing to formalize the notion of privacy that was practically achievable
as well as theoretically verifiable [7]. A survey of differential pri-
vacy in different fields is presented by Dwork [6]. Relevant to eye
tracking are the works that have applied differential privacy defini-
tions to machine learning [2; 15] and time-series analysis [10; 29].
From a societal impact perspective, the eye tracking industry has
as much to gain from these ideas.
2.0.4 Mathematical definition of differential privacy. Formally, given
datasetsD andD ′ that differ in atmost one entry, letM denote a ran-
domized mechanism that outputs a query of a database with some
probability. Then, let S denote a subset of query outcomes (called
an “event”). Then, we say the mechanism M is ϵ−differentially
private (or ϵ−DP in short) if for any S, D and D ′,
Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵPr [M(D ′) ∈ S] , (1)
In the above inequality, the probability comes from the randomness
of mechanismM. Such randomness is necessary as we will see in
Section 3.3. We note that this is a worst-case analysis that offers a
strong guarantee of privacy, because the inequality must hold for
all S, and all neighboring datasets D and D ′.
Another more applicable notion of differential privacy is (ϵ,δ )−
differential privacy, which is a generalization of ϵ−DP. Using the
notation above, we say the mechanismM is (ϵ,δ )−differentially
private (or (ϵ,δ )−DP in short) if for any S, D and D ′ (D and D ′
differs at most one entry),
Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵPr [M(D ′) ∈ S] + δ ,
Typically it is believed that δ = Ω
(
1
n
)
means poor privacy [8]
because it allows some individuals’ data to be fully recovered, where
n is the input size. We note that a mechanism can be (ϵ,δ )-DP
for multiple combinations of (ϵ,δ ). As a rule of thumb, smaller
ϵ’s and δ ’s means better privacy, though we must point out that
directly comparing different numerical values is not informative,
e.g. (0.1, 0.1) and (1, 0) are not comparable.
2.0.5 Toy example. As part of a general wellness dataset D, the
heights of five people are collected. The mean value as the average
height of the population is released. Here, S is the set of outputting
average height. In this example, an adversary obtains the heights
of four of these five persons through hacking. In this way, the
adversary has a dataset D ′ that contains all persons except the fifth.
The adversary computes the average height of the dataset D ′ and
finds that it is much lower than the average height of the dataset D.
The adversary thus infers that the fifth person must be very tall.2
In other words, even though the fifth person was not known by the
adversary, and the dataset D was not released (only the average
height was released), the fifth person is also compromised because
his or her height can be reverse engineered by the adversary. Now,
we introduce a mechanismM that perturbs the average height of
the dataset D by a random amount before releasing it. If the level of
perturbation is high enough, the adversary will not be able to even
infer whether the fifth person is tall or not. Thus the mechanism
M protects the privacy of the fifth person. Of course, if we add too
much perturbation (or, output totally at random), the utility of the
dataset will be affected because the output average height contains
little information and does not reflect the average height of the
population. This is the privacy-utility tradeoff (see Section 4).
2.0.6 Privacy in eye tracking. For much of the past two decades,
the focus of eye tracking research has been on making eye tracking
ubiquitous, and on discovering the breadth of inferences that can
be made from this data, especially in the contexts of health [19]
and education [14]. Privacy has not been a high priority because of
2The adversary can also compute the exact height of the fifth person.
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the benefits of identifying pathology and designing personalized
interventions. The relevance of privacy to eye tracking data was
eloquently discussed by [20]. [21] and [16] have also highlighted
the need for eye-tracking data. Privacy considerations have been
raised both for streaming data, as well as pre-recorded datasets.
Despite growing awareness and concern, few solutions have been
proposed. Our work provides a technical solution for the privacy
of individuals.
2.0.7 Why heatmaps as the first for privacy analysis. Besides scan-
paths, the heatmap is a popular method of visualizing eyemovement
data [4]. Heatmaps, or attentional landscapes as introduced by [27]
and popularized by [31], are used to represent aggregate fixations
[5]. Other similar approaches involve gaze represented as height
maps [9; 30] or Gaussian Mixture Models [24]. Heatmaps are gen-
erated by accumulating exponentially decaying intensity I (i, j) at
pixel coordinates (i, j) relative to a fixation at coordinates (x ,y),
I (i, j) = exp
(
−((x − i)2 + (y − j)2)/(2σ 2)
)
where the exponential decay is modeled by the Gaussian point
spread function. A GPU-based implementation [5] is available for
real-time visualization. Though heatmaps are very popular as a
visualization, AOI analyses and temporal data analysis is key to
eye-tracking research. We have focused on static heatmaps as a
proof of concept for the applicability of differential privacy (DP)
to eye tracking data. Insights from this work will inform future
research on privacy in eye tracking.
3 ANALYZING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY OF
THE PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING
MECHANISMS
In this section, we analyze the differential privacy of four natu-
ral random mechanisms. We show two of these mechanisms can-
not preserve privacy under the notion of DP. For the other two
mechanisms, we provide theoretically guaranteed lower bounds
on the noise required for any user-defined privacy level. Because a
heatmap is created from aggregation of gaze maps, and because this
is a reversible (convolution) process, the privacy of a heatmap is
equivalent to that of the aggregated gaze map on which it is based.
3.1 Notations
We use n to denote the number of observers in the database and r
to denote the total number of pixels in the gaze maps. For example,
an image of resolution 800 × 600 corresponds to r = 4.8 × 105. We
introduce an integerm > 1 to cap every observer’s gaze map. For
example, if an observer looked at one pixel more thanm times, we
only countm in his/her gaze map.3 In Section 4.2, we will discuss
the privacy-utility trade off and provide an algorithm for finding the
“optimal cap”. Let Gi denote the i−th observer’s personal gaze map
(after applying cap). The aggregated gaze map of all n observers in
the database is denoted byG = 1n
∑n
i=1Gi . Here, we normalizeG by
the number of observers in order to compare the noise-level under
different setups. To simplify notations, we use G = (G1, · · · ,Gn )
to denote the collection of all observers’ gaze maps. Similarly, we
use G−i = (G1, · · · ,Gi−1,Gi+1,Gn ) to denote the collection of all
3Think of this as if the gaze map saturated.
observers’ personal gaze maps except the i−th observer. Then, we
will define several gaze-map-aggregation mechanisms as follows:
• Mnoise-free: Directly output the aggregated gaze map. For-
mally,Mnoise-free(G1, · · · ,Gn ) = G = 1n
∑n
i=1Gi .• Mrs1(c): Randomly select cn gazemaps from dataset (without
replacement) and calculate aggregated gaze map accordingly.
Formally, assuming the selected gaze maps areG j1 · · · ,G jcn ,
Mrs1(G1, · · · ,Gn ) = G = 1cn
∑cn
k=1G jk .• Mrs2(c): Similar withMrs1(c), the only difference is the sam-
pling process is with replacement.
• MGaussian(σN ): Adding Gaussian noise with standard devia-
tion (noise-level) σN to all pixels independently. Formally,
MGaussian(σN )(G1, · · · ,Gn ) = G + ϵσN , where ϵσN is a r di-
mensional Gaussian noise term with zero mean and standard
deviation σN (all dimensions are mutually independent).
• MLaplacian(σL ): Similar withMGaussian(σN ), the only differ-
ence is Laplacian noise with noise level σL is added instead
of Gaussian noise.
In short,Mrs1(c) andMrs2(c) inject sampling noise to the output
whileMGaussian(σN ) andMLaplacian(σL ) inject additive noise.
3.2 Defining eye-tracking differential privacy
We start with re-phrasing the definition of (ϵ,δ )−differential pri-
vacy to eye tracking data. In the following discussion, we assume
that the aggregated gaze map G (or its noisy version) has been
publicly released4. The goal of our research is to protect observers’
personal gaze maps G1, · · · ,Gn by adding appropriate noise to the
aggregated gaze map. Using the notation in Section 3.1, we assume
that G−i , all gaze maps other than Gi , are known by the adversary.
For any set S of outputting gaze maps, (ϵ,δ )−differential privacy
is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 ((ϵ,δ )−DP). For any set of event S, any collection
of gaze maps G−i known by the adversary, we say a mechanism
M is (ϵ,δ )−differentially private if and only if
Pr[M(G∗i ,G−i ) ∈ S | G−i ] ≤ eϵ Pr[M(G∗∗i ,G−i ) ∈ S | G−i ] + δ ,
(2)
where G∗i and G
∗∗
i are any gaze maps of the i−th observer.
According to differential privacy literatures [8], there is no hard
threshold between good and poor privacy. For the purpose of illus-
tration, we define the following “privacy levels” in the remainder
of this paper:
• Poor privacy: δ = Ω(1/n).
• Okay privacy: ϵ = 3 and δ = n−3/2.
• Good privacy: ϵ = 1 and δ = n−3/2.
Note “okay privacy” and “good privacy” are two examples we used
for implementation. Practitioners can set their values of ϵ and
δ according to their requirements (smaller ϵ and δ means better
privacy). Note again δ = Ω(1/n) is widely acknowledged as poor
privacy [8].
4Because DP focuses on worst case scenarios, the adversary also knows all other
observers individual gazemaps.
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3.3 There is no free privacy
We first useMnoise-free (poor privacy) as an example to connect
intuition and the definition of DP. Intuitively, if the adversary has
the noiseless aggregated gaze map G and all other observers’ gaze
maps G−i , he/she can perfectly recover Gi by calculating nG −∑
j,i G j =
(∑n
j=1G j
)
−∑j,i G j = Gi .
Using Definition 3.1 and letting G∗i = Gi , G
∗∗
i and S = {G},
Pr[M(G∗i , G−i ) ∈ S | G−i ] = 1 and Pr[M(G∗∗i , G−i ) ∈ S | G−i ] = 0,
because G will not be a possible output if Gi , G∗i . Thus, we
know δ can’t be less than 1 to make Inequality 2 hold. Considering
δ = Ω(1) corresponds to poor privacy, we know Mnoise-free has
poor privacy in the language of (ϵ,δ )−DP defined in Definition 3.1.
3.4 Random selection gives poor privacy
In Section 3.1, we proposed two versions of random selection mech-
anisms. The first version (Mrs1) randomly selects cn observers
without replacement while the second version (Mrs2) selects cn
with replacement.
Theorem 3.2 (without replacement). MechanismMrs1 has
poor privacy.
Proof. We proveMrs1’s privacy by considering the following
case: assuming resolution r = 15, all observers other than the i−th
did not look at the only pixel, we have,
Pr
[
Mrs1(G1, · · · , Gn ) = 1cn
Gi = 1, G−i = 0] = c and
Pr
[
Mrs1(G1, · · · , Gn ) = 1cn
Gi = 0, G−i = 0] = 0,
where G−i = 0 means all elements in collection G−i equals to
0. Thus, we know δ can’t be less than c to make (2) hold. Then,
Theorem 3.2 follows because c = Ω(1/n) (cn = Ω(1) is the number
of observers selected). □
Theorem 3.3 (with replacement). MechanismMrs2 has poor
privacy.
Proof of Theorem 3.3 (see Appendix A in Supplementary materi-
als) is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2.
3.5 Achieving good privacy with random noise
In this section, we show that adding Gaussian or Laplacian noise
can give good privacy if the noise level satisfies certain conditions
based on user-defined privacy levels.
3.5.1 Gaussian Noise. Gaussian noise is widely used noise in many
optical systems. In MGaussian(σN ), we add Gaussian noise with
standard deviation σN independently to all pixels of the aggregated
gaze map. The probability density pN of outputting aggregated
gaze map G(N ) is
pN
(
MGaussian(σN )(G1, · · · , Gn ) = G (N )
)
=
1
(2πσN )r /2
· exp ©­«−
G (N ) −G 22
2σ 2N
ª®¬ ,
(3)
5This case also holds for r > 1 because the first pixel already leaked information.
which is a r dimensional Gaussian distribution such that all dimen-
sions are independent. Note all ℓ2 norm in main paper and appendix
represent Frobenius norm of matrices. For simplification, we use
pN
(
G(N )
)
to represent pN
(
MGaussian(σN )(G1, · · · ,Gn ) = G(N )
)
when without ambiguity. The next Theorem shows announcing
G(N ) (MGaussian(σN )’s output) will not give much information to
adversary if the noise-level is as required (for any (ϵ,δ ), we can
always find noise level σN to guarantee (ϵ,δ )−DP).
Theorem 3.4 (Gaussian Noise). For any noise level σN ≥ mnϵ ·√
r
(
ϵ
2 + ln
r
δ
)
,MGaussian(σN ) is (ϵ,δ )−differentially private.
Theorem 3.4 basically says we can always find a noise level σN
to meet any user-defined privacy level (any ϵ and δ ).
Proof. LetG∗i andG
∗∗
i to denote any two possible gaze maps of
the i−th observer. To simplify notation, we useG−i = 1n−1
∑
j,i G j
to denote the aggregated gaze map from observers other than the
i−th. If the i−th observer’s gaze map isG∗i , the probability density
of the outputting pN (G(N ) | Gi = G∗i ) is
pN (G (N ) | Gi = G∗i ) =
1
(2πσN )r /2
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2N
G∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (N )22
)
,
Similarly, if the i−th observer’s gaze map is G∗∗i , we have,
pN (G (N ) | Gi = G∗∗i ) =
1
(2πσN )r /2
exp
(
− 1
2σ 2N
G∗∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (N )22
)
,
For any G∗i , G
∗∗
i and G−i , we have,
pN (G (N ) | Gi = G∗∗i )
pN (G (N ) | Gi = G∗i )
= exp
(
1
2σ 2N
·
(G∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (N )22 −
G∗∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (N )22
))
≤ exp
©­­­­«
2
G∗in + n−1n G−i −G (N )
2
· G∗∗i −G∗i 2 + G∗∗i −G∗i 22
2σ 2N
ª®®®®¬
.
Letting µ = G
∗
i
n +
n−1
n G−i and considering
G∗∗i −G∗i 2 ≤ m√rn ,
we have,
pN (G (N ) | Gi = G∗∗i )
pN (G (N ) | Gi = G∗i )
≤ exp ©­«
2m
√
r
n
G (N ) − µ 2 + m2rn2
2σ 2N
ª®¬ .
Thus, for any G(N ) such that
G(N ) − µ
2
≤ n
m
√
r
ϵσ 2 − m
√
r
2n ,
the ϵ requirement of DP is always met. Then, we bound the tail
probability for all cases where ϵ ’s requirement is not met.
Pr
[G (N ) − µ 
2
>
n
m
√
r
ϵσ 2N −
m
√
r
2n
]
≤
r∑
j=1
Pr
[G (N )j − µ j  > nm√r ϵσ 2N − m√r2n
]
≤ r · exp
(
−n
2ϵ 2σ 2N
2m2r
+
ϵ
4
)
.
When σN ≥ mnϵ ·
√
r
(
ϵ
2 + ln
r
δ
)
, we have,
Pr
[G (N ) − µ 
2
>
n
m
√
r
ϵσ 2N −
m
√
r
2n
]
≤ r · exp
(
−n
2ϵ 2σ 2N
2m2r
+
ϵ
4
)
≤ δ
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(a) Surfaces for a chosen privacy level. (b) Slice of the surface for 300 × 300 im-
ages.
(c) Original heatmap. (d) Privacy enhanced heatmap for ϵ = 1
level.
Figure 2:We examine the privacy-utility tradeoff for selected values of σN for a simulated heatmap. The greater the noise level
we choose to add, the stronger is the privacy guarantee. The relevant stakeholders decide what level of noise is acceptable for
a given application. For example, in Figure 2d, the hotspots are still clear, and a UX designer may find this acceptable for the
purpose of getting feedback on the design of a website.
Then, Theorem 3.4 follows by the definition of (ϵ,δ )−DP. □
3.5.2 Laplacian Noise. Laplacian noise is the most widely used
in many differential privacy problems. However, we will show
Laplacian noise is not as suitable as Gaussian noise for protecting
eye tracking data. The next Theorem showsG(L) will not give much
information to the adversary if the noise-level is as required.
Theorem 3.5 (Laplacian Noise). Using the notations above, for
any σL ≥
√
2·mr
ϵn ,MLaplacian(σL ) is (ϵ, 0)−differentially private.
Proof of Theorem 3.5 (see Appendix A.2 in supplementary mate-
rial) is very similar with Theorem 3.4. However, the required noise
level, σL ≥
√
2·mr
ϵn , normally is much higher than the requirement
of Gaussian noise, σN ≥ mnϵ ·
√
r
(
ϵ
2 + ln
r
δ
)
. One can see the Lapla-
cian mechanism requires one more
√
r term on noise level, which
normally corresponds to ∼ 102 times higher noise level.
4 PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFF
According to Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5, we know better privacy
(smaller ϵ and δ ) usually requires higher noise level. In this section,
we will conduct experiments to show how Gaussian and Laplacian
noise influence the utility, i.e., the corresponding heatmap.
4.1 Noise level vs. information loss
In Figure 2(a), we show a three-dimensional plot where the x and y
axes are
√
r and n respectively. The reader may revisit notations in
Section 3.1. On the vertical z-axis, we plot σN , specifically based
on the formula given by Theorem 3.4. The upper surface shows σN
for good privacy (ϵ = 1 and δ = n−3/2). The lower surface shows
for okay privacy (ϵ = 3 and δ = n−3/2). Any value of σN above this
surface will provide okay privacy, and any value above the upper
surface will provide good privacy.
In Figure 2 (a), as the image resolution increases, a larger number
of observers is needed in the dataset to maintain the guarantee of
good privacy. If there is a small number of observers, good privacy
can be achieved by downsampling the image. In Figure 2 (b) we
show a slice of this surface at
√
r = 300. The dotted lines show
an example noise level that we could have set based on what we
find acceptable for utility. This is of course user-defined, and will
vary depending on the application. The graphs illustrate that at a
selected noise level, e.g., σN = 1.5, we can achieve good privacy for
a 300×300 image if we have of the order of n = 900 observers. For a
dataset that has n = 300 observers, we can tell the participants that
we can achieve Okay privacy. We show two simulated heatmaps in
Figure 2 (c) and (d). The location of the hotspots is unchanged for
all practical purposes in the noisy but private heatmap.
We quantify the privacy-utility tradeoff in Figure 3. 100 noisy
heatmaps are generated using the workflow in Figure 1. Real-world
1050× 1680 gaze maps from five observers looking at a portrait of a
woman are used here.6 The original heatmap is shown in Figure 1
to the right. For the purpose of the noisy heatmap, we assume
the number of observers in dataset is 50, 0007 (the noise is added
according to n = 50, 000 and Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5). We
simulate this large number of observers by replicating each of the
five real observers 10000 times.
In the supplementary materials, we show the original heatmap
overlaid on the stimulus image in high resolution (original.png). We
also show examples of privacy enhanced heatmaps for this original
heatmap at the ϵ = 1.5 privacy level (privancyenhanced.mpg). For
this image resolution, σG = 0.0986 based on Theorem 3.5.
We numerically analyzed correlation coefficient (CC) and mean
square error (MSE) of noisy heatmaps under different privacy levels
(different values of ϵ while fixing δ = n−3/2). The cap m = 1 is
decided according to Algorithm 1 (see Section 4.2 for details). 100
noisy heatmaps are generated under each setting. The average CC
and MSE of those generated noisy heatmaps are plotted in Figure 3.
Error bars in Figure 3 represent the standard deviations.
It can be seen from the Figure 3 that Laplacian mechanism results
inmuchmore information loss thanGaussianmechanism to achieve
same level of privacy under our setting. For both Gaussian and
Laplacian mechanisms, one can see that better privacy (smaller ϵ)
usually means more information loss in the outputting heatmap.
6Gaze data from dataset of [28], stimulus image from [11] and [23].
7If the number of observer is much smaller than 50,000, the practitioner could either
down-sample gazemaps or sacrifice privacy (setting larger ϵ and δ ) to get an acceptable
noise level.
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Figure 3: Similarity between the privacy enhanced heatmap
andoriginal heatmapwhen ϵ is varied. The smaller the value
of ϵ the stronger is the privacy guarantee from the DP per-
spective. This graph illustrates the privacy-utility tradeoff:
as ϵ is made smaller, the mean squared error increases and
the cross-correlation decreases. The Laplacian mechanism
results in lesser similarity than the Gaussian mechanism.
We note that these graphs are based on real data of only five
observers on one stimulus image. This graph is an example of how a
practitioner may visualize the privacy-utility tradeoff in any given
application domain. In practice, stakeholders would use our pro-
posed workflow on their dataset to prepare such visualizations for
different settings of the internal parameters (m, ϵ,δ ) to help them
evaluate the privacy-utility tradeoff. We note also that Theorem 3.4
is specific to aggregate heatmaps. For any other mechanism, the
appropriate theorems would need to be worked out and the work-
flow modified to be consistent with the problem definition. We also
point out that while mean squared error and cross-correlation are
readily computed, they do not fully reflect the information lost or
retained when noise is added. As an illustration, in Figure 2, the
hotspots in the privacy enhanced heatmap are still clear, and a UX
designer may find that the heatmap acceptable for their use case
even though the MSE and CC metrics suggest otherwise.
4.2 Computing the optimal “cap”
In order to achieve better privacy with less information loss, we set
a cap on the maximum number of times an observer’s gaze position
falls on a pixel. This cap was denoted bym in Section 3. Here we
discuss the information loss on different settings onm.
Whenm is larger, higher noise level is required to get the same
privacy (both the upper bound for σN and σL are proportional to
m). However, larger m also corresponds to less information loss
on every observer’s gaze map. In other words, there is tradeoff
between variance (noise) and bias (cap) on cap. Let G(N ,m,σ ∗) to
denote the gaze map outputted by Gaussian mechanism with cap
m and noise level σN =mσ ∗. Thus, G(N ,∞,0) denotes the original
aggregated gaze map and G(N ,m,0) denotes the aggregated gaze
map with capm without adding any Gaussian noise. Algorithm 1
provides an implementable way to choose the best value ofm to
optimize mean square error (MSE). In the next theorem, we will
analytically analyze the expectation of MSE.
Algorithm 1: Utility optimization algorithm on choosingm
1 Input: Individual gaze maps G1, · · · ,Gn and noise factor σ ∗.
2 Initialization: Calculate G(N ,∞,0) and the maximum number
of times one observer look at one pixel: дmax = maxi, j [Gi (j)].
3 form = 1, · · · ,дmax do
4 Calculate E
[
MSE
(
G(N ,m,σ ∗)
)]
according to Theorem 4.1.
5 end
6 Output:m value with the smallest expected MSE.
Theorem 4.1. The expected MSE of Gaussian mechanism with
capm and noise level σN =mσ ∗ is
E
[
MSE
(
G (N ,m,σ
∗)
)]
=m2σ ∗2 + 1
r
r∑
j=1
(
G (N ,m,0)(j) −G (N ,∞,0)(j)
)2
.
Proof. By the definition of MSE, we have,
E
[
MSE
(
G(N ,m,σ ∗)
)]
=
1
r
r∑
j=1
E
[(
G(N ,m,σ ∗)(j) −G(N ,∞,0)(j)
)2]
Using the notations defined above, the expected square error on
j−th pixel is
E
[(
G (N ,m,σ
∗)(j) −G (N ,∞,0)(j)
)2]
= E
[(
G (N ,m,σ
∗)(j)
)2] − 2G (N ,∞,0)(j) · E [G (N ,m,σ ∗)(j)] + (G (N ,∞,0)(j))2 .
(4)
because G(N ,m,σ
∗)
j ∼ N
(
G
(N ,m,0)
j ,m
2σ ∗2
)
, we have,
E
[(
G(N ,m,σ ∗)(j)
)]
= G(N ,m,0)(j) and
E
[(
G(N ,m,σ ∗)(j)
)2]
= σ ∗2m2 +
(
G(N ,m,0)(j)
)2
.
(5)
Theorem 4.1 follows by combining (4) and (5). □
Then, we analyze the complexity of Algorithm 1 in the next
theorem, which says Algorithm 1 is with linear-time complexity.
Theorem 4.2. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is O (дmax · nr ).
Proof. Rewriting the expected MSE in Theorem 4.1, we have,
E [MSE] =m2σ ∗2 + 1
r
G(N ,m,0) −G(N ,∞,0)2
2
,
where the ℓ2 norm still represents Frobenius norm. Since G(N ,m,0)
and G(N ,∞,0) are r -dimensional vectors, the complexity of comput-
ing expected MSE for a givenm and G(N ,m,0) will be O(m).
Then, we evaluate the complexity of calculating the capped noise-
free aggregated gaze mapG(N ,m,0). Since we are adding cap to each
observer’s individual gaze map, we can add cap to every pixel of all
observers. Thus, one can see there are nr pixels from n observers
in total. Considering the for loop in Algorithm 1 runs дmax times,
Theorem 4.2 follows. □
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5 IMPLICATIONS
5.0.1 Datasets are growing. In contrast to the previous research
paradigm where datasets were collected, archived, and then re-
leased, there is a growing trend to crowd-source data collection,
via mobile apps for example, so that new data is continually being
added to the dataset. With the methods presented, the new data
is safe as long as the publicly available dataset is put through the
Gaussian noise mechanism. Another way that eye tracking datasets
might seek to preserve a user’s privacy is by releasing their eye
movements, but not what they were looking at. With the methods
we present, releasing the stimulus image/video that observers look
at is safe because even in the worst case an adversary will not be
able to guess at what a particular individual looked at.
5.0.2 Why can the generic theorem of differential privacy not be
applied to eye tracking? Unlike classical databases, every observer
in eye tracking database contributes much richer information (i.e.,
millions of pixels) than individuals in classical databases. However,
the generic theorems in differential privacy do not focus on high-
dimensional data. Simply applying union bounds will result in very
loose privacy bounds and unacceptable noise levels.
5.0.3 Why are we adding noise when the field is spending so much
time and effort removing it? There has been much research in eye
tracking to improve the accuracy of eye tracking to maximize the
utility and applicability of eye tracking devices for diverse use cases.
This work has been directed at sources of noise that are inherent
to the process, such as sensor and measurement noise. However, as
eye tracking becomes ubiquitous, there is a cost for the individual
user whose data is being recorded and for the organizations who
are safeguarding and distributing this data. This cost is the sacrifice
of privacy of the individual. We do not argue for reversing the
technological push towards reliable, accurate eye tracking. Rather,
we argue that our objective as a community must expand to include
privacy in addition to utility. For those situations where privacy is
deemed to be worth protecting, we introduce flexible mechanisms
to do so. Noise is added to data in the aggregate, not to any indi-
vidual’s data. Further, the noise function is fully understood, and
its parameters are set based on the desired privacy-utility tradeoff.
Unlike measurement noise, whose source may not be fully under-
stood, we add noise in a controlled and measured way to achieve a
specific objective.
5.0.4 Why should the research community care? This research re-
quires an interdisciplinary approach. The eye tracking community
cannot just “leave it to the privacy researchers” because the theo-
retical guarantees that form the basis of this framework are highly
dependent on the particular mechanisms that the data goes through
(the functional forms in the equations, the particular thresholds,
etc.). These mechanisms have to be developed collaboratively to
preserve the utility of the output for eye tracking applications.
5.0.5 Why should the industry care? The push towards ubiquitous
eye tracking is being driven by large investments by major industry
players. While their applications are highly data-dependent, their
customers are increasingly data-sensitive. This paper proposes the
first of a class of solutions which pair theoretical analysis from
a DP-perspective with a practically implementable workflow for
developers. This work opens the door for a responsible industry
that can inform their users that while they may eye track the users
at very high accuracy and resolution to enable foveated rendering
(for example), they would put this data through mechanism A or B
before releasing it to the app developers.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have proposed to apply the notion of differential privacy to-
ward the analysis of privacy of eye-tracking data. We have analyzed
the privacy guarantees provided by the mechanisms of random se-
lection, and additive noise (Gaussian and Laplacian noise). Themain
takeaway from this paper is that adding Gaussian noise will guar-
antee differential privacy; the noise level should be appropriately
selected based on the application. Our focus is on static heatmaps as
a sandbox to understand how the definitions of differential privacy
apply to eye tracking data. In this sense, this paper is a proof of
concept. Eye tracking data is fundamentally temporal in nature,
and the privacy loss if an adversary could access saccade veloci-
ties and dynamic attention allocation would be much greater than
static heatmaps. Future work would systematically consider all the
different ways in which eye tracking data is analyzed and stored.
We have considered two noise models (Gaussian and Laplacian
noise). Follow up work might consider the privacy-utility trade-off
for different noise models like pink noise. For temporal data such as
raw eye movements, it may even be relevant to understand which
noise models are more realistic. In other words, if the user’s virtual
avatar was driven by privacy enhanced eye tracking data, it should
still appear realistic and natural.
The mechanisms and analyses presented here apply to real-
valued data that can be aligned to a grid and capped to a maximum
value without loss of utility. Though our focus has been on eye
tracking heatmaps, there are other data that fall in this category, for
example, gestures on a touchscreen, or readings from a force plate.
It would also be interesting to generalize these mechanisms and
analyses to other physiological data such as heart rate, galvanic
skin response, and even gestures or gait. These data are conceptu-
ally similar to eye tracking data in that they carry signatures of the
individual’s identity and markers of their health and well-being.
Furthermore, in physiological domains many data and analyses are
temporal in nature. It would be interesting and important to define
and analyze differential privacy for temporal data.
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A MISSING PROOFS FOR THEOREMS
A.1 Proof and discussion for Theorem 3.3
Theorem 3.3 saysMrs2 has poor privacy.
Proof. Considering the same case as the proof of Theorem 3.2,
we have,
Pr
[
Mrs2(G1, · · · , Gn ) ≥ 1cn
Gi = 0, G−i = 0] = 0 and
Pr
[
Mrs2(G1, · · · , Gn ) ≥ 1cn
Gi = 1, G−i = 0]
= 1 −
(
1 − 1
n
)cn
≈ 1 − e−c = Θ(c)
Thus, we know δ can’t be less than c to make Inequality 2 hold
and Theorem 3.3 follows. □
A.2 Proof for Theorem 3.5
Proof. The probability density function pL of output G(L) =
(G(L)(1). · · · ,G(L)(r )) is
pL
(
MLaplacian(σL )(G1, · · · , Gn ) = G (L)
)
=
1(√
2σL
)r · exp (−√2σL G −G (L)1
)
.
To simplify notations, we use pL
(
G(L)
)
to represent
pL
(
MLaplacian(σL )(G1, · · · ,Gn ) = G(L)
)
when without ambiguity.
Let G∗i and G
∗∗
i to denote any two possible gaze maps of the i−th
observer. If the i−th observer’s gaze map is G∗i , the probability
density function of the outputting pL(G(L) | Gi = G∗i ) is
pL (G (L) | Gi = G∗i ) =
1(√
2σL
)r exp (−√2σL
G∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (L)1
)
,
where we abused notation to let G−i = 1n−1
∑
j,i G j , which is the
aggregated gaze map except Gi . Similarly, if the i−th observer’s
gaze map is G∗∗i , we have,
pL (G (L) | Gi = G∗∗i ) =
1(√
2σL
)r exp (−√2σL
G∗∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (L)1
)
.
For any G∗i , G
∗∗
i and G−i , we have,
pL (G (L) | Gi = G∗∗i )
pL (G (L) | Gi = G∗i )
= exp
(√
2
σL
·
(G∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (L)1 −
G∗∗in + n − 1n G−i −G (L)1
))
≤ exp
(√
2 · | |G∗∗i −G∗i | |1
σLn
)
≤ exp
(√
2 ·mr
σLn
)
.
Since the probability is the integral of PDF, the above upper bound
for PDF ratio is also an upper bound for probability ratio. Thus, for
any possible output set S , we have,
Pr
[
MLaplacian(σL )(G∗i ,G−i ) ∈ S | G−i
]
≤ exp
(√
2 ·mr
σLn
)
Pr
[
MLaplacian(σL )(G∗∗i ,G−i ) ∈ S | G−i
]
.
and Theorem 3.5 follows by applying Definition 3.1. □
